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COMMENT
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RIGHTS OF ILLINOIS
PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS
Legislation enacted over the past forty years has enhanced the collective
bargaining rights of many private sector employees.' Public employees,
however, have derived little benefit from the progressive changes made in
the private sector. For example, the Illinois General Assembly has failed
to enact comprehensive legislation regarding the collective bargaining rights
of public school teachers. Moreover, traditional legal obstacles to teacher
collective bargaining rights have prevented the Illinois Supreme Court from
recognizing the attitudinal and educational benefits that can flow from in-
creased teacher participation in the negotiation process. Many jurisdictions
have responded either judicially or legislatively to mounting dissatisfaction
among public employees, particularly teachers.2 To improve the quality of
its public education, Illinois must respond similarly.
Although Illinois teachers' collective bargaining problems might be at-
tributed exclusively to legislative inaction, the absence of comprehensive
legislation is not the sole cause of the current unsatisfactory conditions. These
conditions exist primarily because the Illinois Supreme Court has ignored
available mechanisms that are capable of protecting teachers. Using the "il-
legal delegation" doctrine, the court has substituted its own political and
social values for those provided by the General Assembly.3
This Comment will review the significant decisions restricting the collec-
tive bargaining rights of Illinois teachers, and discuss available legislative
and judicial options. Additionally, this Comment will argue that legislative
reform is necessary to overcome judicial hostility to the rights of Illinois
public school teachers. Clear statutory language, mandating bilateral deci-
sion making and expressly delineating the scope of negotiable issues, must
replace judicial lawmaking in the collective bargaining area. Comprehensive
legislation has the potential to reduce teachers' dissatisfaction over wages
and working conditions, enable teachers to utilize their professional exper-
tise more effectively, and stimulate progress in the development of educa-
tional practices.
1. Collective bargaining is defined as open and fair dealing between an employer and an
employee representative to exchange views and proposals, and to strive to reach agreement on
matters of wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 158(5) (1976).
2. J. WErIZMAN, THE SCOPE OF BARGADIING IN PUBLIc EMPLOYMENT 19-52 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as WEITZMAN].
3. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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BACKGROUND
A. Historical Review
The seeds of American unionism were planted around 1786, when
Philadelphia journeymen planned to strike for a minimum wage of one dollar
per day.' From its inception, the American labor movement was hindered
by the courts.' The criminal conspiracy doctrine, which prohibited employees'
concerted efforts to achieve better working conditions and higher compen-
sation, was used to foster industrial growth at the expense of the employees.
When the judiciary abandoned this doctrine, unions began lobbying for pro-
tective legislation. The success of this lobbying effort was demonstrated by
legislation that immunized unions from prosecution under the Sherman An-
titrust Act,' made yellow dog contracts unenforceable,' permitted employee
self-help measures after exhaustion of statutory mediation procedures, 8 and
granted employees the right to organize and bargain collectively without
employer interference. 9
4. M. SCHNAPPER, AMERICAN LABOR: A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY 24 (1975).
5. Feldman, The Illinois Judiciary and Public Employee Labor Disputes: A Return to an
Imperial Judiciary?, 53 Cm.[-]KENT L. REV. 619, 620 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Public Employee
Labor Disputes]. See generally 3 J.R. COMMONS, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL
SOCIETY 59, 620-21 (1910). In 1842, Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842),
initiated a shift from criminal liability to civil liability for controlling union activity. Hunt
held that a finding of criminal conspiracy required proof of either an illegal purpose or illegal
means and was, therefore, inapplicable to union activity.
After Hunt, courts increasingly relied on both the tort of intentional infliction of economic
harm and the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), to discourage union activity. See,
e.g., United Mine Workers of Am. v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922) (a labor organiza-
tion that gave its officers authority to order a strike was held liable in tort for injuries resulting
from the strike); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (a union's instigation of a boycott
violated the Sherman Antitrust Act and subjected individual union members to liability for
treble damages). Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act now shields individtials
from liability for damages that result from a strike, whether or not the activities were autho-
rized by a union. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1976); see Complete Auto Transit v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401 (1981) (the legislative intent of § 301
was to ensure that individuals would not be held liable for damages arising from violations
of collective bargaining agreement no-strike provisions, even if such violations were authorized
by a union).
6. Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). The Clayton Act was passed in 1914, but the
Supreme Court reduced its impact by construing it narrowly in the context of labor unions.
See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
7. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976). A yellow dog contract is one in
which the employee agrees, as a condition of employment, not to be a member of a union.
Public Employee Labor Disputes, supra note 5, at 628.
8. Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 154-164, 181-188 (1976). This act directs that disputes
between railroads and their employees are to be considered and, if possible, decided in con-
ference between the representatives of the parties involved. If the dispute cannot be settled
in this manner, it may be referred by petition of either party to the National Railroad Adjust-
ment Board, created by the Act. See Public Employee Labor Disputes, supra note 5, at 631.
9. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970) (NLRA).
Section 7 of the NLRA provided employees with the right to form unions, enter into collective
bargaining agreements, and engage in activities for their mutual aid and protection. Section
8 prohibited employer interference with the rights conferred on employees in § 7. The Labor
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Due to the doctrine of state sovereignty, legislation securing private sector
collective bargaining rights was inapplicable to public employees.'" Under
traditional notions of government, an individual is precluded from suing the
state without its consent." For this reason, public employees have not en-
joyed the same legal remedies in enforcing contractual agreements as their
private sector counterparts.' 2 The very notion of collective bargaining has
been regarded as inimical to the unilateral decision-making power of the
sovereign unit. 3 At the heart of the sovereignty doctrine lies the fear that
government will be disabled from performing its unique responsibility to
balance the interests of all its citizens if certain groups are permitted to
negotiate in their own self-interest. The New York Supreme Court articulated
this fear in 1943:
Nothing is more dangerous to public welfare than to admit that hired serv-
ants of the State can dictate to the government the hours, wages and con-
ditions under which they will carry on essential services vital to the welfare,
safety and security of the citizen. To admit as true that government
employees have power to halt or check the functions of government, unless
their demands are satisfied, is to transfer to them all legislative, executive
and judicial power. Nothing would be more ridiculous.' 4
Although the sovereignty doctrine has been judicially and legislatively
eroded since the New York decision, 5 the related doctrine of "illegal delega-
tion" has provided an alternative barrier to public employee collective
bargaining. While the sovereignty doctrine emphasizes the supremacy of the
government's power, the illegal delegation doctrine emphasizes the exclusivity
of that power. The doctrine of illegal delegation precludes governmental
power from being entrusted to, or shared with, private associations. 6 Col-
Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-167,; 171-197 (1976), amended § 8
of the NLRA by forbidding unions from engaging in secondary boycotts, jurisdictional strikes
over work assignments, and strikes to force an employer to discharge an employee because
of his or her union affiliation or non-affiliation. See Public Employee Labor Disputes, supra
note 5, at 631.
10. The concept of "sovereignty" derives from English common law notions that "the king
can do no wrong" and no individual could sue the state without its consent. WEITZMAN, supra
note 2, at 7.
11. Democratically elected officials have invoked this doctrine in the name of the people
to protect the public interest. Id.
12. Id.
13. W. HART, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE 44 (1961).
14. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Murphy, 44 N.Y.S.2d 601, 607, 180 Misc. 868, 875 (1943), aff'd,
326 U.S. 88 (1945). Appellants maintained that article 20 of the New York labor law, which
excluded public employees from organizational and collective bargaining rights conferred on
the private sector, denied them equal protection of the laws. The Supreme Court rejected this
contention, stating that "[tihe state may well have thought that the problems arising in connec-
tion with private employer-employee relationships made collective bargaining legislation more
urgent and compelling than for government employees." 326 U.S. at 95.
15. WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 8-10. Legislation passed by Congress and the states gradually
has given individuals the right to sue the government for various injuries. Also, court decisions
have eroded the doctrine in areas, such as tort claims, in which the government formerly was
immune from suit. Id.
16. Id. at 10.
19831
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
lective bargaining agreements have been considered improper, or illegal delega-
tions of governmental authority, because they limit the discretionary power
of the government and its agencies.7
B. Progress in the Public Sector
Since 1959, when Wisconsin became the first state to enact comprehensive
collective bargaining legislation,' 8 there has been wide acceptance of public
employee collective bargaining rights. By the mid-1970's, forty states had
followed Wisconsin's lead and enacted similar legislation.' 9 These statutes,
however, extend varying amounts of power to public employees.2" In the
ten states lacking legislation authorizing public sector collective bargaining,
public employers have complete unilateral control over the terms of
employment. 2' Statutes authorizing collective bargaining limit this control.
Two types of statutory models have been designed to create public employee
bargaining power; yet hybrid variations of these models also exist.
"Meet and confer" legislation guarantees public employees the right to
present their opinions prior to employer policy making.22 Although public
employees have the right to communicate their views to their employers under
17. See Comment, Non-Salary Provisions in Negotiated Teacher Agreements: Delegation
and the Illinois Constitution, Article VII, Section 10, 24 DEPAUL L. REV. 734 (1975) (agreements
invalid as delegation of legislative powers and arbitration improper as delegation of school
board's authority) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Negotiated Teacher Agreements].
18. See Wis. STAT. § 111.70 (1959). This law gives municipal employees the right to form
a union and bargain collectively, prohibits coercion or interference with union membership,
provides a method for peaceful dispute settlement, and establishes procedures for selecting
representatives and determining appropriate units for collective bargaining. Id.
19. WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 40. The following states do not have collective bargaining
legislation for public employees: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee and West Virginia. Id.
20. In Indiana, for example, certain issues must be bargained collectively, whereas others
may be bargained collectively at the sole option of the employer. Those issues that must be
bargained are salary, wages, hours, and salary and wage-related fringe benefits. Optional issues
are: working conditions; curriculum development and revision; textbook selection; teaching
methods; selection, assignment, and promotion of personnel; student discipline; expulsion and
supervision of students; pupil-teacher ratio; class size; and budget appropriations. IND. CODE
§§ 20-7.5-1-1 to 20-7.5-1-4 (1975).
Rhode Island is much more restrictive in the subjects it allows to be bargained collectively.
Employers are only required to meet and confer with teacher representatives on the issues of
hours, salary, working conditions, and all other terms and conditions of professional employ-
ment. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-9.3-1 to 28-9.3-16 (1979).
On the other end of the spectrum, Nebraska allows collective bargaining of any subjects
requested to be bargained by employee organizations. However, Nebraska provides that employers
may meet with employee organizations if they so choose. If they do meet and negotiate, the
parties are required to execute a written agreement. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-1287 to 79-1295 (1976).
21. See McClintock, Guideline Considerations to Help Resolve 'Scope' of Bargaining Ques-
tions: Identifying the Shifting Demarcation Between 'Negotiable' and 'Nonnegotiable' Subjects,
1980 GoNz. PUB. LAB. L. REP. 57, 73 [hereinafter cited as McClintock].
22. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3517 (West 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 105.500-.530 (Ver-




this model, public employers retain authority to make all ultimate decisions.
The advisory participation encouraged under this statutory model falls far
short of what is meant by collective bargaining in the private sector.23 Public
employees' dissatisfaction with management has resulted in a trend away
from the "meet and confer" approach, and toward the more bilateral
"negotiations" model.2 '
Most states have enacted "negotiations" or "collective bargaining" laws.25
Patterned after the private sector's National Labor Relations Act,2" these
statutes create an arms-length relationship between employer and employee;
such a relationship requires shared decision making.27 Although this statutory
model appears to expand greatly the bargaining power of public employees,
restrictions on the scope of what may or must be bargained can render this
power illusory. A brief examination of Michigan and California case law
demonstrates that the range of power possessed by public employees is deter-
mined by the judiciary's construction of the "negotiations" statute.
In Central Michigan University Faculty Association v. Central Michigan
University," the Michigan Supreme Court noted that the statutory "duty
of a public employer to bargain collectively with employees' representatives"
was patterned after section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act. 9 Ac-
cordingly, the court interpreted the mandatory collective bargaining subjects,
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment," to include
any "aspect of the employment relationship" that has an "effect on
employees' status ...even if it may be said to be only minimally a condi-
tion of employment."" As a result of this expansive interpetation of the
phrase "other terms and conditions of employment," Michigan requires the
following subjects to be bargained collectively: salaries, overtime pay, shift
differentials, holiday pay, pensions, no-strike clauses, profit-sharing plans,
grievance procedures, sick leave, seniority and promotion, work rules, com-
pulsory retirement age, employee evaluation procedures, and management
rights. 3 I
By contrast, the Alaska Supreme Court, in Kenai Peninsula Borough v.
Kenai Peninsula Education Association,32 interpreted "wages, hours and other
terms and conditions of employment" as words of limitation in the public
23. McClintock, supra note 21, at 73-74. Collective bargaining laws in the private sector
provide for shared decision making between employer and employee. Id.
24. R. DOHERTY & W. OBERER, TEACHERS, SCHOOL BOARDS, AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING:
A CHANGING OF THE GUARD 84-90 (1967) [hereinafter cited as DOHERTY & OBERER].
25. WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 41.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1976).
27. McClintock, supra note 21, at 74.
28. 404 Mich. 268, 273 N.W.2d 21 (1978).
29. Id. at 276, 273 N.W.2d at 24. The Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act
imposes a mutual obligation on employer and employee to bargain collectively. 29 U.S.C. §
8(d) (1973).
30. 404 Mich. at 280, 273 N.W.2d at 26.
31. Id. at 278, 273 N.W.2d at 25 (citing Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit,
391 Mich. 44, 214 N.W.2d 803 (1974)).
32. 572 P.2d 416, 422 (Alaska 1977).
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sector. The Kenai court held that the more a matter deals with the economic
interests of employees, and the less it concerns professional goals and
methods, the more susceptible it is to bargaining. 3 Accordingly, the court
determined that the number of hours to be worked, salaries, and fringe
benefits were negotiable issues. Nevertheless, the following matters remained
nonnegotiable and were to be determined unilaterally by the school board:
relief from nonprofessional chores, elementary planning time, paraprofes-
sional tutors, teacher specialists, teacher's aides, class size, pupil-teacher ratio,
teacher ombudsman, teacher evaluation of administrators, school calendar,
selection of instructional materials, use of secondary department heads,
secondary teacher preparation and planning time, and teacher representa-
tion on school board advisory committees.34
The disparate results of litigation arising from various statutes which are
based upon the same model suggest that judicial philosophy, ultimately, may
be more crucial to teachers' collective bargaining rights than the type of
statute enacted, its wording, or even the absence of legislative collective
bargaining authorization. A review of the judicial philosophy in Illinois proves
this point and highlights the inadequacy of the legislature's piecemeal ap-
proach to the problem.33
33. Id. at 423.
34. The court stated that because teacher, student, and community interests are not always
coextensive, allowing teachers to bargain on matters of educational policy could "threaten the
ability of elective government officials and appointive officers subject to their authority, in
this case the school boards and administrators, to perform their functions in the broad public
interest." Id. at 419. The Michigan and Alaska experiences demonstrate that broad statutory
language may result in judicial interpretations that are inconsistent with legislative intent. To
prevent this result, some states define the scope of collective bargaining in the legislation itself.
For example, New Hampshire's statute provides that "the state retains the exclusive right
. . . to direct, . . . appoint, promote, discharge, [and] transfer . . . employees . . . and
take whatever actions are necessary to carry out the mission of the agency or department in
situations of emergency." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 98-c:7 (Supp. 1969). In other jurisdictions,
specific collective bargaining restrictions derive from civil service systems or executive orders.
See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 42-43.
Although most states include public school teachers in general collective bargaining legisla-
tion, a number of states have promulgated statutes specifically applying to teachers. These statutes
permit a broad range of issues to be subject to collective bargaining. By 1974, 17 of the 29
states that had enacted legislation authorizing teacher negotiations adopted statutes specifically
applying to teachers. Id. at 50-51.
Irving Sabghir suggested that the fact that there is more legislation applicable to teachers
than to any other type of public employee reflects the reality that in recent years teachers have
become the most militant public employee group. I. Sabghir, The Scope of Bargaining
in Public Sector Collective Bargaining (Oct. 1970) (discussed in WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at
50 n.*). Weitzman postulated that such laws reflect legislative recognition of the professional
status of teachers. WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 51.
35. The Illinois General Assembly has authorized collective bargaining for Chicago Transit
Authority employees, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1113, § 328a (1981), and school board employees,
id. ch. 122, § 10-22.40a (1981). Governor Dan Walker created collective bargaining rights for
all state employees. See WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 48. Yet, these actions have failed to achieve
the results of the Labor Management Relations Act. There is no comprehensive teacher bargain-
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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS IN ILLINOIS:
THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS
The public sector doctrine of illegal delegation is similar to the corporate
doctrine of ultra vires; acts of government outside the scope of its authority
are void. Courts often rely on the illegal delegation doctrine, also known
as the "Dillon Rule," 3 to void contracts that exceed the scope of a school
board's authority.37 The Illinois Supreme Court adopted this doctrine in
1831, 3' and first applied it to public education seventy-five years later in
Lindblad v. Board of Education.3 In Lindblad, the Normal School District
was authorized by statute4 0 to manage and "control the common ... schools
and transact all business which may be necessary in relation to [the] common
schools and [to exercise] all the rights, power and authority necessary for
the proper management of the schools and school funds ... .'" A contract
between the school district and the State of Illinois permitted a state univer-
sity, in conjunction with the superintendent of schools, to select university
students to teach in the public schools under the supervision of a licensed
teacher. Relying on the Dillon rule, the Lindblad court held this contract
to be void as an unlawful delegation of the school board's authority to select
student teachers."2 Lindblad, the first of many cases presenting the issue of
illegal delegation by a school board, established a negative judicial attitude
toward such delegation that still exists.
Subsequent Illinois appellate court decisions have applied the illegal delega-
tion doctrine to collective bargaining. In Chicago Division of the Illinois
ing act, and no previous acts have altered the delegation posture of the school board-teacher
relationship.
36. See 1 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448-50 (5th ed. 1911). The Dillon Rule provides:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law'that a municipal corporation possesses
and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express
words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers express-
ly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and
purposes of the corporation, -not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair,
reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts
against the corporation and the power is denied.
Id. (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
37. See infra notes 39-85 and accompanying text.
38. See Betts v. Menard, 1 I11. (Bresse) 395, 399-400 (1831). In Betts, the County Commis-
sioners' Court of Randolph County, pursuant to a statute which authorized it to grant licenses
to establish ferries, issued a ferry boat license to the trustees of the town of Kaskaskia. The
Illinois Supreme Court stated that the statutory authorization extended only to individual licenses
and not to a corporate body that could in turn determine who would exercise ferry privileges.
Accordingly, Betts held that absent a legislativetgrant of direct or implied power,\ the lower
court's licensing constituted an illegal delegation.
39. 221 111. 261, 77 N.E. 450 (1906).
40. 3 I11. Priv. L. 321, 333 (1867).
41. 221 Ill. at 266-67, 77 N.E. at 452.
42. Id. at 271-72, 77 N.E. at 453. The court also held that because the school board lacked
authority to substitute the personal services of its licensed teachers or to employ them in a
critic-teacher function, payment to the licensed teachers under the contract resulted in an unlawful
diversion of public money. Id. at 274, 77 N.E. at 454.
1983]
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Education Association v. Board of Education,3 a taxpayer sued to prevent
a school board from honoring its collective bargaining agreement with teacher
organizations. The plaintiff claimed that such bargaining constituted an il-
legal delegation of the school board's authority. Although the court upheld
the validity of the bargaining agreement, it failed to delineate the scope of
matters that could be bargained. Thus, while collective bargaining agreements
were not held to be impermissible per se, the Chicago Division court's holding
does not preclude a finding that if specific provisions of such agreements
were too broad they would constitute illegal delegation.
Chicago Division appeared to increase the flexibility courts had under the
Dillon rule to determine the existence of an illegal delegation. For example,
while one Illinois appellate court held that the board of education has
exclusive authority to determine job qualifications," another upheld col-
lective bargaining provisions that imposed procedural limitations on the
board's authority to hire, discharge, or transfer employees." The guidelines
for determining what was permissible initially seemed to turn on whether the
restriction on the board was procedural or substantive. The Illinois Supreme
Court, however, rejected this procedural-substantive distinction in Illinois
Education Association v. Board of Education." In that case, a non-tenured
teacher was terminated for cause, but without the benefit of an evaluation
procedure required by a collective bargaining agreement. The trial court's
43. 76 Il1. App. 2d 456, 459, 222 N.E.2d 243, 244 (1st Dist. 1966).
44. See Board of Educ. v. Rockford Educ. Ass'n, 3 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 1094, 280 N.E.2d
286, 288 (2d Dist. 1972). The collective bargaining agreement in this case provided that all
promotional positions be filled "on the basis of qualification for the vacant post." Id. A guidance
counselor who was denied promotion to a vacant administrative position despite a recommen-
dation from the superintendent of schools, sought arbitration to determine the meaning of
the word "qualification." Staying arbitration, the trial and appellate courts held that the deter-
mination of administrative qualifications involved the board's non-delegable discretionary author-
ity; the ultimate determination of the meaning of "qualification" was reserved exclusively to
the board and could not be arbitrated.
Some commentators maintain that the delegation issue has been confused by ambiguous ter-
minology. See, e.g., L. Weiner & S. Katz, Teacher Rights and Responsibilities, 1 ILLINOIS SCHOOL
LAW §. 12.41 (IICLE 1980). A clearer understanding could result if the Illinois courts used
"delegation" only with reference to the grant of power to another entity; "usurpation" only
with reference to the taking of such powers and duties; and "limitation" only with reference
to a board's limitation of its discretion through means other than delegation.
45. See Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 15 Ill. App. 3d 224, 304 N.E.2d
516 (3d Dist. 1973). The teachers association in this case challenged the involuntary change
of status of a tenured counselor to that of a teacher without granting the hearing required
by the existing collective bargaining agreement. The appellate court noted that the prior hear-
ing required by the collective bargaining agreement did not restrict the board's ultimate power
to hire, discharge, or transfer its employees. Id. at 228, 304 N.E.2d at 519. Accordingly, it
held that the provision represented a voluntary agreement to follow reasonable evaluation pro-
cedures and, therefore, was consonant with public policy and enforceable. Id. at 229, 304 N.E.2d
at 520.
Classroom Teachers Ass'n distinguished the right to a hearing prior to a determination of
a teacher's qualifications from a challenge to the determination itself. The appellate court ex-
plained that because the former was merely a procedural limitation on the board's authority,
it was not an illegal delegation.
46. 62 III. 2d 127, 340 N.E.2d 7 (1976).
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reinstatement of the teacher was affirmed by the appellate court."7 Holding
that the terms of the collective bargaining agreement could neither expand
nor contract the board's statutory powers, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed
the teacher's reinstatement." The supreme court reasoned that because the
statute conferred discretion upon the school board to dismiss non-tenured
teachers, any agreement limiting this discretion would constitute an illegal
delegation of authority."9
Board of Education v. Johnson0 represents another attempt by the Illinois
Appellate Courts to establish a basis for distinguishing permissible collective
bargaining agreements from illegal delegations. In that case, the First District
established a major-minor dispute test to determine the existence of illegal
delegation. The issue in Johnson was whether the school board could submit
disputes over interpretation of collective bargaining provisions to an arbitrator.
Distinguishing major from minor disputes, the court held that only the latter
could be arbitrated." While a major dispute involves a subject statutorily
reserved to a school board's discretion," a minor dispute merely involves
an interpretation of collective bargaining agreement provisions that do not
contravene the school code."
The major-minor dispute test, established in Johnson, appeared to be a
sensible and principled way to determine when the school board could delegate
its authority. Yet, by broadly defining what constitutes a major dispute, the
Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District drastically restricted the types
of matters that could be bargained collectively. For example, the collective
bargaining agreement in Wesclin Education Association v. Board of
47. 23 Ill. App. 3d 649, 320 N.E.2d 240 (lst Dist. 1974). The appellate court was unable
to distinguish Classroom Teachers Ass'n. Id. at 659, 320 N.E.2d at 247-48.
48. 62 Il. 2d at 130, 340 N.E.2d at 9.
49. Id. at 131, 340 N.E.2d at 9. Because Illinois Educ. Ass'n did not involve the issue
of arbitration, the supreme court's interpretation of the delegation doctrine emanated from
the perceived contractual limitations of the board's discretionary authority, rather than from
the procedural involvement of a third party. Id.
50. 21 Ill. App. 3d 482, 315 N.E.2d 634 (1st Dist. 1974). The Johnson court examined
two grievances. The first grievance was filed by a teacher who maintained thai she was transferred
in violation of her contractual seniority rights. The second grievance was brought by a group
of teachers seeking to enforce the collective bargaining agreement that exempted them from
clerical duties. The teachers maintained that requiring them to record students' names on monthly
attendance cards exceeded the statutory requirement that they keep daily registers, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 122, §§ 18-12, 24-18 (1971), and violated the collective bargaining agreement that
exempted them from clerical work. 21 I11. App. 3d at 485, 315 N.E.2d at 637.
51. 21 111. App. 3d at 491, 315 N.E.2d at 641.
52. Id. The court stated that tacit approval of this test was given in Board of Educ. v.
Champaign Educ. Ass'n, 15 I11. App. 3d 335, 304 N.E.2d 138 (4th Dist. 1974), which held allega-
tions of specific violations of the school code to be outside the proper scope of collective bargaining
and arbitration.
53. 21 111. App. 3d at 491, 315 N.E.2d at 641. Employing this test, the court held that
the first grievance could not be arbitrated because the transfer question involved a determina-
tion of qualifications, which was a duty expressly reserved to the Board by the Illinois School
Code. Because the administration of attendance cards was not specifically dealt with in the
code, it was classified as a minor dispute, properly subject to contractually mandated arbitration.
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Education,5" provided non-tenured teachers with procedural safeguards against
dismissal. The school code, however, vested authority to dismiss non-tenured
teachers in the school board. This authority was limited only by a require-
ment that a teacher be given sixty days notice of dismissal. Finding a major
dispute, the Wesclin court held the bargaining agreement's provision unen-
forceable because it limited the discretionary power statutorily conferred upon
the school board. Thus, the court's application of the major-minor dispute
test caused the invalidation of a collective bargaining agreement that sought
to protect teachers by requiring a more stringent dismissal procedure than
was provided statutorily.
Although the Illinois Supreme Court never acknowledged the major-minor
dispute test, it provided additional guidance in a series of cases involving
arbitration. The supreme court examined the relationship between arbitra-
tion and illegal delegation in Board of Trustees v. Cook County College
Teachers Union, Local 1600." Three issues were presented in Board of
Trustees. The first issue was whether an arbitrator could award teaching con-
tracts to non-tenured teachers who were dismissed in violation of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement's procedural requirements. 6 The court reasoned
that because the Board had exclusive authority to appoint teachers, the
arbitrator lacked authority to renew employment contracts as a remedy for
a collective bargaining agreement violation. Accordingly, the court vacated
the arbitrator's award of reinstatement."
The second issue in Board of Trustees was whether faculty promotions could
be arbitrated. 8 The court maintained that the Public Community College
Act, by empowering the Board "to employ such personnel as may be needed,
to establish policies governing their employment and dismissal and to fix
54. 30 111. App. 3d 67, 331 N.E.2d 335 (5th Dist. 1975).
55. 62 Ill. 2d 470, 343 N.E.2d 473 (1976).
56. The non-tenured teachers in Board of Trustees were dismissed without receiving the
prior advisory faculty evaluations and recommendations required by a collective bargaining agree-
ment. Id. at 473, 343 N.E.2d at 475.
57. Id. at 476-77, 343 N.E.2d at 476. The court also held that non-tenured teachers lacked
a sufficient property interest to invoke due process protection. The Board of Trustees court
cited Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593 (1972), as support for its determination that non-tenured teachers were not entitled to a
due process hearing prior to the Board's decision not to renew their contracts. In Roth, a
non-tenured teacher filed suit against a Wisconsin state university for not retaining him after
his initial one-year contractual term. Claiming that the unarticulated reason for the university's
failure to rehire him was his criticism of the university administration, Roth alleged violations
of his constitutionally guaranteed rights to freedom of expression and to procedural due proc-
ess. The district court granted summary judgment to the Board of Regents on the procedural
due process issue, 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970), and the seventh circuit affirmed, 446
F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court upheld the lower court rulings on the basis that
a non-tenured teacher lacks sufficient property or liberty interests to invoke the protection of
fourteenth amendment procedural due process. 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972). In Perry v. Sinder-
mann, the Court held that tenure, established either by contract or by a de facto tenure policy,
entitles a teacher to procedural due process safeguards prior to non-retention. 408 U.S. 593,
603 (1972).
58. 62 I11. 2d at 478, 343 N.E.2d at 477.
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the amount of their compensation,"" implicitly reserved to the Board the
authority to grant or deny promotions. Consequently, the supreme court
declared the collective bargaining agreement allowing arbitration of faculty
promotions to be an illegal delegation.
60
The final issue resolved in Board of Trustees was whether an arbitrator's
back pay award was an illegal delegation.6 1 The trial court had granted the
Board's motion for summary judgment and modified the arbitrator's award
by requiring teachers to perform extra work. The appellate court for the
first district affirmed, 2 but the Illinois Supreme Court held that the back
pay award did not constitute an illegal delegation because the Board retained
the authority to select extra courses and to determine who was qualified
to teach them.
63
Board of Trustees is significant because it resolved the threshold question
of the validity of binding arbitration provisions. Yet, while validating the
inclusion of binding arbitration in collective bargaining agreements, the Board
of Trustees court failed to delineate the scope of an arbitrator's authority.
In establishing that an arbitrator could award back pay but could not order
reinstatement, the court failed to explain why it distinguished between these
enforcement mechanisms. If these remedies were distinguished because one
is retroactive (back pay) and the other is prospective (reinstatement), it is
difficult to reconcile the distinction with the court's holding that promotion
determinations cannot be arbitrated. With respect to faculty promotions, an
arbitrator could only require the school board to follow the evaluation pro-
cedures embodied in the collective bargaining agreement. This does not seem
to be a retroactive remedy in the same sense as an award of back pay; never-
theless, both issues were declared to be beyond the scope of permissible
arbitration.
Board of Trustees v. Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 16006
created additional confusion in defining the scope of permissible arbitration.
As a result of a strike settlement, nonstriking teachers were unforeseeably
disadvantaged in competing for summer school teaching opportunties. An
arbitrator determined that the collective bargaining agreement's system of
59. JLL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 103-42 (1973).
60. 62 111. 2d at 478-79, 343 N.E.2d at 477.
61. The back pay award was the result of a grievance which alleged that certain teachers
had been deprived of the opportunity to teach summer school because the Board failed to
follow the rotational scale provided by the collective bargaining agreement. The matter was
arbitrated and the teachers received retroactive compensation for the lost income. Dissatisfied
with the result of arbitration, the Board filed suit in the circuit court seeking declaratory relief
and a modification of the arbitrator's award. The complaint alleged that the arbitrator's award
of back pay constituted an illegal expenditure in violation of article VIII, § 1 of the Illinois
Constitution. 62 Il. 2d at 479-80, 343 N.E.2d at 477-78.
62. 22 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 318 N.E.2d 202 (1st Dist. 1975).
63. 62 Ill. 2d at 480, 343 N.E.2d at 478. Consequently, the only remaining issue was whether
the courts should have modified the arbitrator's award. Relying on United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (holding that arbitrators may
award back pay), the Board of Trustees court reversed and remanded the case. 62 111. 2d at
481, 343 N.E.2d at 478.
64. 74 Il1. 2d 412, 386 N.E.2d 47 (1979).
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determining summer school teaching priority did not include special provi-
sions for strike situations." Thus, striking teachers were entitled to the windfall
priority.
The Board of Trustees challenged the validity of this determination. The
trial court issued a declaratory judgment and injunction in favor of the Board
on the basis that the award favored "illegal actions contrary to public
policy." 6 Determining that the matter was a proper subject of arbitration,
the appellate court reversed.6" The Illinois Supreme Court, however, reversed
the appellate court on public policy grounds. Although the arbitrator's award
drew "its essence from the collective bargaining agreement," the supreme
court concluded that the extraordinary strike situation raised "an issue of
overriding public policy" that dictated a reversal of the "unjust" award.6"
Thus, this case demonstrates that although arbitration is a judicially favored
mechanism, the Illinois Supreme Court remains its moral overseer. 9
65. Id. at 418, 386 N.E.2d at 49.
66. Id. at 415, 386 N.E.2d at 48.
67. 55 I11. App. 3d 435, 371 N.E.2d 66 (1st Dist. 1977).
68. 74 111. 2d at 423, 426, 386 N.E.2d at 52, 53. Initially, the supreme court adopted the
deferential standard of review established in three decisions commonly referred to as the
Steelworkers Trilogy. Id. at 418-19, 386 N.E.2d at 50 (citing and adopting United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am.
v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers of Am.
v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960)). After noting that the deferential standard used
in the Steelworkers Trilogy would not apply if there were an illegal delegation, the court an-
nounced that this case did not involve an illegal delegation. Id. at 419-20, 386 N.E.2d at 50.
69. Id. at 423-25, 386 N.E.2d at 52-53. The court cited White Star Mining Co. v. Hultberg,
220 I11. 578, 601-10, 77 N.E. 327, 335-39 (1906), as the case that established the common law
grounds for vacating an arbitration award. 74 I11. 2d at 418, 386 N.E.2d at 49. According
to Hultberg, the only circumstances in which court intervention is justified are fraud, corrup-
tion, partiality, misconduct, mistake, and failure to submit the question to arbitration. None
of these grounds was found to exist in College Teachers Union. Id. at 420, 386 N.E.2d at
50. Thus, while the supreme court articulated strong support for the arbitration process, its
substantive review of the result operates to undermine the very system it applauds. The College
Teachers Union holding is irreconcilable with other Illinois Supreme Court decisions that ex-
pressly disavow any notion that courts are empowered to act as "super-arbitrators."
For example, in Board of Educ. v. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, 86 111. 2d 469,
427 N.E.2d 1199 (1981), an arbitrator allowed a teacher who had been attacked during school
hours to receive double compensation for her injuries and absence. The Illinois Supreme Court
upheld the arbitrator's award, not because it agreed with the arbitrator, but because of the
narrow grounds upon which a court is free to vacate such an award. The arbitrator awarded
$34,936.10 to the teacher, who had been beaten viciously by an unknown assailant in the hallway
of a Chicago public elementary school. The teacher's collective bargaining agreement stated:
"Teachers or other bargaining unit members whose absences result from school-related assault
shall be paid full salary and medical expenses by the Board and no deduction shall be made
from sick leave." The Board opposed the award on the basis that the teacher had already
been compensated under the workers' compensation statute. Id. at 472, 427 N.E.2d at 1200.
Considering the conflicting policies of double recovery and teacher safety, the court noted that:
The problem of security in urban schools is a familiar and serious one. It is obvious
that there can be no education where there is no security for students, teachers or staff.
Article 44-8, by providing double recovery, is a positive step in this area that recognizes
reality and provides extraordinary measures for teachers victimized by school related
violence.
Id. at 476, 427 N.E.2d 1202.
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More recently, in Board of Education v. Chicago Teachers Union, Local
1,7 0 the Illinois Supreme Court retreated from the approval of arbitration
announced in Board of Trustees. The dispute in Chicago Teachers Union
involved an annual salary provision in a collection bargaining agreement.
Although teachers and career service employees were entitled to an annual
salary under the agreement, the Board decided to save money by closing the
schools one day earlier than originally planned and deducting wages for that
day from teachers' salaries.' Alleging that this deduction violated the agree-
ment's salary provisions, the union sought arbitration. In response, the Board
sued to enjoin the arbitration.7 " The circuit court granted the injunction but
the appellate court reversed, holding that the agreement guaranteed teachers
an annual salary for a thirty-nine week school year unless there was a lack
of funds, a condition not supported by the evidence.73 In reversing the
appellate court, the Illinois Supreme Court observed that the Board's discre-
tionary power under the school code enabled it to control budgetary con-
siderations and to close schools earlier that the date established by the annual
calendar.7" The supreme court found these discretionary powers to be
nondelegate and, accordingly, invalidated the collective bargaining agreement.75
Chicago Teachers Union is flawed in several respects. For example, the
Board's power to close the public schools earlier than planned was unrelated
to the agreement's annual salary provision.76 Additionally, the statutory pro-
visions enabling the Board to decrease teachers' salaries are limited to situa-
tions in which contractual expenditures exceed budgetary appropriations.7 7
Moreover, the Illinois Supreme Court selectively enforced the school board's
contractual obligations by relying on its own view of what best promotes
the collective public good. In so doing, the court created uncertainty that
"will only result in greater financial difficulty over time as creditors become
wary of the school board and require better terms to compensate for the
risk of extending credit under those circumstances. '""
The preceding discussion demonstrates that the Illinois Supreme Court con-
sistently has protected the exclusive authority of school boards to establish
the terms and conditions of their teachers' employment. By invoking the
doctrine of illegal delegation, the court denied public school teachers the
same degree of control over establishing employment terms that was possessed
by their counterparts in the private sector. Instead, the school board was
held to have unilateral power to dismiss teachers without procedural
safeguards, to decide whether to renew teacher contracts, and to grant or
70. 88 Ill. 2d 63, 430 N.E.2d 1111 (1981).
71. It would have cost the Board approximately $2,800,000 to pay the teachers' salary for
one day. Id. at 67, 430 N.E.2d at 1113.
72. The union filed a counterclaim to compel arbitration. Id.
73. 89 Il1. App. 3d 861, 866-67, 412 N.E.2d 587, 591-92 (1st Dist. 1980).
74. 88 Ill. 2d at 72, 430 N.E.2d at 1116. The court analogized this power to the power
to dismiss employees. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 75, 430 N.E.2d at 1117 (Simon, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 80-81, 430 N.E.2d at 1119-20 (Simon, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 80, 430 N.E.2d at 1119 (Simon, J., dissenting).
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deny promotions. Teachers were not allowed to participate in such matters,
either directly through collective bargaining agreements or indirectly through
binding arbitration.
THE IMPACT OF LEGISLATION
A. The Absence of Legislation as a Cause of Collective Bargaining
Difficulties Among Teachers
At least one commentator has attributed the unsettled relations between
Illinois public school boards and their teachers to the Illinois General
Assembly's failure to enact comprehensive legislation providing for public
sector collective bargaining." The absence of such legislation, however, is
not the cause of teachers' collective bargaining problems; moreover, if enacted
such statutory provisions would not substantially expand teachers' collective
bargaining rights. An examination of alternative judicial approaches indicates
that the Illinois Supreme Court's continued reliance on the doctrine of illegal
delegation is more a result of judicial predilection, than of the absence of
statutory collective bargaining provisions.
The Illinois School Code of 1961 authorized the Chicago Board of Educa-
tion to "exercise general supervision and management of . . . the public
school system of the city .. . [and] all other powers that may be requisite
or proper to the maintenance and development of the public school system.""0
Based on this broad delegation of authority, the Illinois Supreme Court could
have recognized that the power to enter into a collective agreement is one
which is "requisite and proper to the maintenance and development of the
public school system." 8' By doing so, the court could have avoided the delega-
tion problem entirely; all collective bargaining contracts would have been
viewed as binding exercises of the school boards' statutory authority. In-
stead, Illinois' highest court employed the doctrine of illegal delegation to
nullify only those contracts that were disadvantageous to school boards.8 2
The 1970 Illinois Constitution provided the Illinois Supreme Court with
another vehicle to avoid the devastating effects of Dillon's Rule. 3 Article
20, section 10 of the Illinois Constitution provides that "[u]nits of local
government and school districts may contract and otherwise associate with
individuals, associations, and corporations in any manner not prohibited by
law or ordinance." 8 This provision could have been used by the court to
overrule the delegation doctrine. The constitutional convention debates clearly
79. See Clark, Public Employee Labor Legislation: A Study of the Unsuccessful Attempt
to Enact a Public Employee Bargaining Statute in Illinois, 20 LAB. L.J. 164, 173 (1969).
80. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 34-18 (1961).
81. Id.
82. See supra notes 36-78 and accompanying text.
83. See Comment, Negotiated Teacher Agreements, supra note 17, at 742 (the purpose of
the local government article of the 1970 Illinois Constitution was to reverse Dillon's Rule).
84. ILL. CONST. art. XX, § 10.
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indicate that this provision was intended to overrule the delegation doctrine."
Moreover, other jurisdictions have demonstrated that such a result can be
achieved through similar provisions.
8 6
Thus, Illinois' continued reliance on the doctrine of illegal delegation is
primarily due to its courts' protectionist political philosophy, rather than
to the absence of statutory collective bargaining provisions. Nevertheless,
the question remains whether comprehensive legislation would enhance the
rights of public school teachers.
B. The Legislative Remedy
Employees in the private sector are prohibited from bargaining on issues
within the sphere of management prerogatives.8 This prohibition is justified
by the belief that the only legitimate concerns of workers are wages, hours,
and conditions of employment. The nature, design, quality and price of the
product are issues reserved to the unilateral control of management because
of its expertise in these areas, and because these issues involve the com-
petitive, risk-taking initiative that distinguishes management from labor.8
The private sector model, based upon a profit-motive, production-oriented
enterprise, is inappropriate in the area of public education. Because of the
expertise teachers possess in areas beyond the terms of their employment,
the private sector model of limited employee involvement should not be
adopted in public education collective bargaining.89 Both the National Educa-
tion Association and the American Federation of Teachers support bilateral
determination of issues beyond wages, hours, and conditions of employment. 90
85. While the condition "in any manner not prohibited by law" raises the question of whether
the provision supercedes the delegation theory, an examination of the amendment debates reveals
that such a result was intended. See Comment, Negotiated Teacher Agreements, supra note
17, at 742-46. The Mathis-Martin amendment, which reinstated the authority of school districts
and non-home rule units to delegate power, presented the convention with a clear choice. The
amendment passed 82 to 5. See 7 RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 1603-04 (1970).
86. For example, in Dayton Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Dayton Bd. of Educ., 41 Ohio
St. 2d 127, 323 N.E.2d 714 (1975), the Ohio Supreme Court interpreted a similar provision,
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.17 (Page 1973), and validated a collective bargaining agreement
containing a broad range of teacher concerns including: teacher environment, salaries, payroll
deductions, leaves of absence, promotions, enforcement of discipline, evaluation, transfers,
paydays, academic freedom and binding grievance arbitration. In 1980, an Ohio appellate court
reaffirmed this position by stating that "where a school board has benefitted from an agree-
ment and seeks to have it upheld, the courts generally apply normal principles of contract
law to test the contract's validity and binding effect." Cleveland City School Dist. v. Cleveland
Teachers Union, 68 Ohio App. 2d 118, 121-22, 427 N.E.2d 540, 543 (1980) (citing Dayton
Classroom Teachers Ass'n).
87. DOHERTY & OBERER, supra note 24, at 90 (concerns of the worker are distinguished
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Legislation in some jurisdictions has successfully limited the traditional
concept of managerial prerogatives. For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that by enacting a mandatory collective bargaining statute, the
Pennsylvania legislature had demonstrated an intent to "[encroach] upon
the former autonomous position of management" in order to "restore har-
mony within the public sector." 9' Accordingly, Pennsylvania courts have en-
forced collective bargaining agreements that provide benefits beyond those
expressly authorized by the statute.92 Minnesota courts have also deviated
from the concept of managerial prerogatives although they have articulated
a public policy rationale. In International Brothers of Teamsters Local 320
v. City of Minneapolis,93 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the provi-
sions in a state mandatory bargaining act, severely restricting strikes, justified
a broad construction of the statute's scope. The court maintained that a good
working relationship between public employers and their employees could be
accomplished best through a meaningful system of negotiation and bilateral
dispute resolution procedures.9 '
Yet, unless a state statute contains a clause divesting the public employer
of its management prerogatives,9" courts usually presume that the legislature
intended to preserve such prerogatives.9" For example, an Alaska statute
broadly provides for negotiation "in good faith on matters pertaining to
[teachers'] employment and the fulfillment of their professional duties." 97
Nevertheless, the Alaska Supreme Court held that a broad number of sub-
91. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494,
504-05, 337 A.2d 262, 267 (1975).
92. See, e.g., Leechburg Area School Dist. v. Leechburg Educ. Ass'n, 24 Pa. Commw.
256, 259, 355 A.2d 608, 610 (1976).
93. 302 Minn. 410, 413, 225 N.W.2d 254, 256 (1975).
94. Id. at 415-16, 225 N.W.2d at 257; see also McClintock, supra note 21, at 66. Califor-
nia, Iowa, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, Rhode Island, Washington and Wisconsin have
taken similar positions. See City and County of San Francisco v. Cooper, 13 Cal. 3d 898,
918, 534 P.2d 403, 416, 120 Cal. Rptr. 707, 720 (1975) (en banc); Barnett v. Durant Commun-
ity School Dist., 249 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Iowa 1977); Central Mich. Univ. Faculty Ass'n v.
Central Mich. Univ., 404 Mich. 268, 277, 273 N.W.2d 21, 25 (1978); American Fed'n of State,
County, and Mun. Employees v. County of Lancaster, 200 Neb. 301, 302, 263 N.W.2d 471,
473 (1978); Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 122, 128,
282 N.E.2d 109, 112, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17, 22 (1972); Belanger v. Matteson, 115 R.I. 332, 339,
346 A.2d 124, 130 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968 (1976); Glendale Professional Policemen's
Ass'n v. City of Glendale, 83 Wis. 2d 90, 99, 264 N.W.2d 594, 599 (1978); Edmonds Educ.
Ass'n v. Edmonds School Dist. No. 15, WASH. PUBL. EMPL. REL. REP., Dec. 207, EDUC (April
11, 1977).
95. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3543.2 (West 1980) (limiting the scope of collective bargain-
ing issues to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, and defining terms
and conditions of employment as "health and welfare benefits .... leave, transfer and reassign-
ment policies, safety conditions of employment, class size, procedures to be used for the evaluation
of employees, organizational security .... [and] procedures for processing grievances"). See
generally J. GRODIN, D. WoLLETr & R. ALLEYNE, JR., COLLECTIE BARGAINING IN PUBLIc EMPLOY-
MENT 126 (3d ed. 1979) (questioning whether a "shopping list" approach is desirable).
96. McClintock, supra note 21, at 69.
97. ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.550 (1975).
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jects pertaining to teacher working conditions were improper subjects of col-
lective bargaining.98 Considering the Illinois Supreme Court's similar predilec-
tion for preserving managerial prerogatives, in order to safeguard teachers'
rights and utilize their resources fully, the General Assembly should enact
a statute specifically delineating the scope of collective bargaining. Further-
more, in order to overcome judicial hostility to the rights of public school
employees, such a statute should itemize those issues which must be bargained
bilaterally. The legislature should expressly reject both the illegal delega-
tion doctrine and the managerial prerogative principle. An elastic clause ex-
pressing legislative intent to favor bilateral decision making also may be
necessary to remedy the mounting dissatisfaction of public school teachers
with their employment relationship. Anything short of an unequivocal com-
mand is unlikely to overcome the ideological favoritism the Illinois Supreme
Court has shown toward public school boards.
C. The Constitutional Problem
This Comment has advocated that the Illinois General Assembly should
enact comprehensive legislation to overcome the judicial hostility to public
school teachers' collective bargaining rights. It should be noted, however,
that such legislation must be drafted carefully in order to avoid constitu-
tional infirmity. Courts might interpret a statute authorizing binding interest
arbitration as an unconstitutional delegation of the legislature's power,
because only the legislature has the authority to determine certain matters. 99
Constitutional problems rarely exist when a constitution expressly authorizes
the legislature to delegate its power to administrative entities.I", When a consti-
tution expressly prohibits such delegation, statutes authorizing arbitration often
are declared unconstitutional."' Moreover, if a state constitution is silent as
98. Kenai Peninsula Borough School Dist. v. Kenai Peninsula Educ. Ass'n, 572 P.2d 416,
422 (Alaska 1977) (holding the following to be nonnegotiable: relief from nonprofessional chores,
elementary planning time, paraprofessional tutors, teacher specialists, teacher's aides, class size,
pupil-teacher ratio, teacher ombudsman, teacher evaluation of administrators, school calendar
selection of instructional materials, the use of secondary department heads, secondary teacher
preparation and planning time, and teacher representation on school board advisory committees).
99. An Illinois statute provides: "The school board may enter into agreements with employees
or representatives to resolve disputes and grievances by binding arbitration before disinterested
third parties." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.4a (1981). It is unclear whether this act authorizes
interest or merely grievance arbitration. Its failure to define the scope of arbitration renders
it impotent, as any contractual agreement still would be subject to the delegation doctrine.
Moreover, its broad language and undefined goals would present constitutional problems if
it were given any impact at all. See State v. Traffic Telephone Workers' Fed'n, 2 N.J. 335,
66 A.2d 616 (1949) (legislature must prescribe standards that govern an administrative agency
that was delegated limited legislative power on a specific subject or delegation is unconstitutional).
100. See, e.g., Harvey v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969) (after Pennsylvania amended
its constitutional prohibition of arbitration, the court held that the express acceptance of in-
terest arbitration protected it from constitutional attack).
101. See, e.g., Erie Firefighters Local 293 v. Gardner, 406 Pa. 395, 178 A.2d 691 (1962)
(recommendations of a panel, established by an act providing a grievance procedure for employees
forbidden by law to strike, are not binding on a municipal lawmaking body).
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to the extent of the legislature's power to delegate its authority, courts usually
require that the delegation be accompanied by narrow, detailed administrative
guidelines. "02
The Illinois Supreme Court requires that delegation of legislative power
identify: "(1) [tlhe persons and activities potentially subject to regulation;
(2) the harm sought to be prevented; and (3) the general means intended
to be available to the administrator to prevent the identified harm."" 3 Ac-
cordingly, to either avoid or survive a constitutional challenge, a statute
authorizing binding interest or grievance arbitration should articulate
specifically the goals of improved employee relations and greater educational
quality through increased teacher participation and bilateral decision mak-
ing. Furthermore, specific administrative guidelines should be included to
reduce administrative discretion to a constitutionally permissible scope. For
example, an arbitrator might be required to remain within budgetary ap-
propriations and to consider the municipality's financial resources, the public
interest, educational research, wage comparison with comparable communities,
and cost of living factors.'"" Binding arbitration and legally enforceable col-
lective bargaining agreements should be pursued as the preferred methods
of limiting strikes, satisfying employee demands, and upgrading the quality
of public school education.
CONCLUSION
The illegal delegation doctrine, firmly established in Illinois, has been used
to deprive public school teachers from enjoying the collective bargaining rights
possessed by private sector employees. Although a collective bargaining agree-
ment between a public school board and its teachers does not constitute an
illegal delegation per se, the agreement's provisions will be invalidated if
they impermissibly encroach upon the board's authority. The vague and in-
consistent guidelines for determining the permissible scope of bargaining make
it almost impossible to predict which collective bargaining agreement provi-
102. See, e.g., City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Fireman's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109, 256
A.2d 206 (1969) (General Assembly's unconditional delegation of its legislative power is
unconstitutional).
103. Stofer v. Motor Vehicle Casualty Co., 68 I11. 2d 361, 372, 369 N.E.2d 875, 879 (1977)
(emphasis in original). Delegation must also identify the persons and activities potentially sub-
ject to regulation. Id. Under these criteria, a statute allowing the State Director of Insurance
to promulgate uniform insurance policies was upheld because the legislature indicated an inten-
tion to prevent the chaotic proliferation of disparate fire insurance policies and provided substan-
tial safeguards which limited the Director's discretion. Id. at 373-74, 369 N.E.2d at 879-80.
Yet, when the Director of Financial Institutions was empowered to set maximum rates currency
exchanges could charge, the court struck the enabling legislation as unconstitutional because
the legislature failed to define the problem and limit the administrator's discretion beyond a
"reasonableness" requirement. Thygesen v. Callahan, 74 II1. 2d 404, 409-10, 385 N.E.2d 699,
702 (1979).
104. These limiting criteria were approved in Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation
and Arbitration, 370 Mass. 769, 352 N.E.2d 914 (1976). They protect the interests of the com-
munity while concurrently shifting the responsibility of providing quality education to the teachers.
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sions will be declared void. While the major-minor dispute test, promulgated
in Johnson, seems to prevail among the appellate districts, Illinois Supreme
Court decisions do not consistently support the test's analysis. Moreover,
by invoking the delegation doctrine in the name of public policy, the Illinois
Supreme Court has further increased the uncertainty in public school teacher
collective bargaining rights.
A comprehensive collective bargaining statute could alleviate the uncer-
tainty, professional apathy, and wage-related militancy that currently plagues
Illinois public schools. Legislation authorizing grievance arbitration for both
procedural and substantive matters contained in collective bargaining
agreements could prevent bargains made in good faith from being struck
down by the Illinois Supreme Court and, accordingly, enhance respect for
the educational system. Binding interest arbitration could benefit communities
by allowing teachers to use their expertise in establishing the goals, methods
and conditions of education. Additionally, it could stimulate educators to
make greater contributions toward raising the quality of education. A statute
expressing these goals and providing discretionary guidelines would encourage
progress in education without violating the requirements of the Illinois
Constitution.*
Robin Katz
* On April 5, 1983, Senate bill 0536 was introduced in the Illinois General Assembly.
If enacted, this bill would establish a comprehensive law governing labor relations between
public employees, the State of Illinois, and its political subdivisions. Among other things, Senate
bill 0536 provides for collective bargaining for public school teachers. If this bill becomes law,
many of the problems identified in this Comment would be resolved.-Ed.
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